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1. Introduction: 
The paper argues that authenticity in religious discourses is not an 
absolute and universal entity, but that it is shaped/defined and reshaped/redefined 
in various socio-political contexts. Hence, the significance of these socio-political 
contexts is far more than what is generally assumed. To substantiate this 
argument, I have deconstructed the constitutive processes of authenticity in the 
Jamaat-i-Islami’s (hereafter referred to as JI) gender discourse analyzing its 
interaction with the political space in Pakistan. The paper has selected some 
gender-related issues for analysis. These issues are: (1) The Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961 (hereafter referred to as MFLO), (2) the JI’s support to Ms. 
Fatima Jinnah1 as a presidential candidate of Pakistan, (3) Hudood Ordinances, 
1979 (hereafter referred to as HOs), (4) The Protection of Women Act, 2006 
(hereafter referred to as PWA), and (5) election of women members of the JI on 
reserved seats for women in the Parliament. 
There are two important matters which need explanation before beginning 
an analysis of the selected gender issues referred to in the list above. The first is 
the selection of the JI’s gender discourse for analysis and what are main features 
of its gender discourse. The second is the notion of authenticity employed in the 
paper which is different from the generally understood connotation of the term.   
Let us explicate the first issue. The JI is one of the most organized religio-
political parties of Pakistan (Nasr 1994: Joshi 2003). It was organized by Maulana 
Abul Ala Maududi in 1941 before partition of the Indian Subcontinent (Nasr 
1996, 41). Maududi kept on anchoring and supervising the JI for more than three 
decades till his death in 1979. According to Nasr (1996, 3), Maududi is “the most 
influential of contemporary revivalist thinkers.” The same is the opinion of 
Jackson (2011). At present, Maududi’s brainchild, the JI, works under the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fatima Jinnah was the youngest sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) founder of 
Pakistan.  
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name “Jamaat-i-Islami” in five geographical locations in the Indian Subcontinent 
(Grare 2005, 11). The JI’s influence has exceeded far beyond its place of birth, 
i.e. the Indian Subcontinent. It maintains links and has established sister 
organisations in the USA, UK, and other parts of the world, and such ideological 
connections are maintained largely due to the diaspora of the Subcontinent (Grare 
2005, 102). Maududi’s ideological influence may also be observed in Central 
Asia, North Africa and Southeast Asia (Nasr 1996, 4). 
Maududi wrote on gender issues extensively. His most important book on 
the subject is Purdah2 (2003) written in Urdu and published in 1940. The book 
was translated into English as Purdah and the Status of Woman in Islam (2010).3 
Maududi (1943; 2010) was one of the most vocal proponents of the duality of 
spheres between men and women. In simple terms, duality of spheres signifies 
that activities outside the home are to be carried out by men while women’s 
sphere of activity is within the home. According to Maududi (1943; 2010), this 
scheme of division of labour into two distinct and complementary spheres is not 
only sanctified by their essentialist and different human nature but it is also 
considered as apposite in light of the divine. We will come across in two out of 
five selected gender issues in the paper where the JI adjusts this standard version 
under the influence of different socio-political contexts.  
Let us now discuss how the term authenticity, which is at the foundation 
of the analysis carried out in the paper, has been employed. The notion of 
authenticity as understood in religious discourses takes it as a static and an 
immutable entity which is not liable to transformation and reshaping. This paper 
regards authenticity as susceptible to change and influence by multiple factors 
including the socio-political context. Authenticity is not taken to be as defined 
once and for all; rather, it goes through the same path which is travelled by the 
authenticity seekers. Thus, authenticity is not universal and absolute; it is 
contingent and always opened to re-evaluation and reassessment. The reason for 
adopting this variant understanding of authenticity is that it is more conducive to 
the nature of analysis in this paper. If we take authenticity as a stable and 
immutable entity as is generally understood, then we would be left with single 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It means seclusion and veiling. 
3 There are other books by Maududi dealing with gender issues including Khawateen aur Deeni 
Masayl, Haquq us Zojjain, Tafheemul Quran, Deen aur Khawateen, Rasael-o-Masayl. 
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argument,  that a particular discourse does not conform to its standard stance in 
this and that situation. 
This notion of authenticity has been derived from the famous French 
philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of truth. According to Foucault (Rabinow 
1984, 4; 12: Gordon 1980, 230-231: Foucault 1980, 66; 93: Foucault 1984, 72-73; 
74), there are four characteristics of truth which are also present in my use of 
authenticity in this paper. Firstly, there is no universal and absolute notion of 
authenticity, which is similar to Foucault’s concept of truth i.e. authenticity is 
relative and contextual. Secondly, authenticity ought to be deconstructed 
from an analysis of its constructive processes instead of searching it at an 
abstract level within the parameters of right and wrong. Thirdly, the paper 
regards authenticity in JI’s discourse as constructed by its day to day religio-
political experiences. Fourthly, authenticity in JI’s gender discourse is shaped 
and reshaped by different configurations of power which work within the 
discourse and also influence it from outside, i.e. its socio-political context.   
Informed by this notion of authenticity, the paper argues that authenticity 
in JI’s gender discourse is continuously defined and redefined due to its 
interaction with a particular socio-political context. Hence, the latter is a 
significant factor for constructing authentic versions or stances of the JI at 
different junctures in politico-legal history of Pakistan. Even though the paper is 
meant to highlight socio-political context as an important factor in shaping the 
authenticity of JI’s gender discourse, it should not be taken to mean that it is the 
sole and exclusive factor in this regard. The paper’s sole focus on the socio-
political context is for illustrating its significance which is often eclipsed by a 
passionately assertive reading of the divine. Another extreme and hasty 
conclusion would have been to regard the JI as a product of its socio-political 
context. This last conclusion is as faulty as the earlier one. What could be said 
instead is that the JI contributes to the political space of Pakistan after being 
inspired by its ideological underpinnings and political goals. What would appear 
during the analysis is that the JI’s contributory role is often downplayed by 
structural and emphatic influences of the socio-political context.  
Let me point out an important limitation of the paper: it has not debated 
the religious texts and their varying interpretations. Since the focus of the paper is 
to analyze the role and significance of the socio-political context in construction 
of JI’s gender discourse, any discussion of the religious texts and their 
interpretations would tend to derail the analysis or make it more voluminous. 
Hence any such attempt is consciously avoided. Let us now discuss the selected 
episodes one by one. 
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2. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO): 
This Ordinance is one of the most contentious ordinances in the legal 
history of Pakistan. In 1955, a Commission on Marriage and Family Laws4 was 
constituted to suggest amendments in the laws regarding marriage, divorce, 
maintenance, and other ancillary matters with a view to ameliorate women’s 
status in the society (Rehman 1997, 3). The Commission was composed of seven 
members: three women and four males, and one of them was a religious scholar.5 
The JI was not represented in it. The Commission presented its recommendations 
in 1956 and all members were unanimous in its findings and suggestions, except 
the religious scholar Maulana Ihtisham-ur-Haq. The MFLO is based on these 
recommendations. 
The changes brought about by the MFLO were quite significant. It 
introduced compulsory registration of marriages, allowed inheritance rights to 
orphaned grandchildren from their grandparents6, regulated polygamy and 
divorce, and regarded unspecified dower as prompt in case its mode of payment is 
not settled in the marriage contract. After comparing the recommendations of the 
Commission and the MFLO, Pearl (1969, 182) has opined that “minor reforms” 
were introduced by the MFLO. This statement refers to the fact that all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is known as “Rashid Commission.” 
5	  Following were selected as members of the Commission: 
(1) Begum Shamsunnahar Mahmud, 
(2) Begum Anwar G. Ahmed, 
(3) Begum Shah Nawaz, 
(4) Mr. Enayat-ul-Rehman, 
(5) Khalifa Abdul Hakeem, 
(6) Mian Abdul Rashid, Ex-Chief Justice of Pakistan  
       (7)   Maulana Ihtisham-ul-Haq (Rehman 1997, 3).	  
6 Orphaned grandchildren are not allowed to inherit anything from their grandparents their uncles 
and aunts are alive according to classical law of inheritance as practiced by all Sunni schools of 
thoughts.  
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recommendations of the Commission did not find favor with the government 
while enacting the MFLO. Despite the selective approach of the government in 
this regard, there were many factors shaping the severe and critical response by 
various religious segments of the country, including the JI.  
The post-independence period in Pakistan was marked by the religious 
enthusiasm of religio-political parties. These parties were hopeful of pushing 
forward their agenda of Islamization due to the fact that the state was not well 
entrenched, and these groups were of the view that they would have an 
opportunity to accomplish their programs. To some extent, the government 
responded to them in a positive way by adopting the Objectives Resolution in 
1949 which is considered a cornerstone of Islamic constitutionalism in Pakistan 
(Muhammad 2001).7 This raised hopes of the religious parties that the country is 
drifting towards thorough Islamization. The JI regarded it as the foundation stone 
of an Islamic state and an Islamic license to enter into electoral politics in 
Pakistan (Nasr 1994). The JI galvanized this event and proclaimed that the 
Objective Resolution had baptized the new born state of Pakistan into Islam 
(Muhammad 2001, 69). 
This scenario of hope, quite paradoxically, was not without an entirely 
opposite feeling of fear. There was an unspoken understanding among religious 
segments of the country that we must not give in, in that sphere, to secular laws, 
which was regulated by Islamic law in the colonial period. During the colonial 
period, family laws were part of that protected sphere; these laws were generally 
not interfered with because they were understood to be the core of Shariah  
(Anderson 1959, 39-40).   
The post-colonial legal domain in Pakistan was characterized by a mixture 
of two strands of jurisprudence: one was secular, and the other presumed to be 
divine (Pearl 1969, 66). Given the colonial heritage, the family laws were based 
on religious interpretations and un-codified Islamic law, while the rest of the 
domain was mostly regulated by secular law. In such a scenario, it was perceived 
by the religious segments of the country that if the secularists were successful in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Objectives Resolution was passed in the Constituent Assembly to guide the legislative 
process in the early days of Pakistan as a country. It was resolved in that resolution that 
sovereignty of the country would be vested in Allah Almighty and the representatives of the 
people would exercise their power as a trust. Moreover, it was stated therein that Muslims would 
be provided with an atmosphere that would be helpful for them to live according to the tenets of 
Islam. Full text of the resolution is available online 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/annex_objres.html (Accessed on 14/12/2012). 
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implementing their agenda, the family laws would be “largely affected” (Pearl 
1969, 166). Therefore, any maneuvering in the protected sphere of Shariah was 
perceived to jeopardize the Islamic character of the family laws, and in this 
manner, would strengthen the secular elements of the country. On the other hand, 
the Commission’s recommendations were specifically meant for the regulation of 
different family issues which were not interfered with by the colonial government.  
The JI was appreciative of the colonial government for accommodating 
the religious sensibilities of Muslims by not interfering with family laws (Islahi 
1958, 12-13). In JI’s perspective, the religious aspect of the laws ought to have 
been looked into more attentively after the independence of Pakistan rather than 
changing them massively, as attempted on the basis of the Commission’s 
recommendations (Islahi 1958, 12-19). On the contrary, the same non-interference 
with family laws by the colonial government facilitated members of the 
Commission to criticize it as this attitude let the laws to stagnate (Islahi 1958, 12). 
This perception of non-interference was not accurate as many changes 
were made to the Muslim family law by the colonial government. For example, 
laws relating to matters of legitimacy and putative widowhood,8 the minimum age 
of marriage,9 and divorce10 were substantially changed (Esposito 1980, 222-223; 
230). Despite the erroneous appraisal by the JI regarding non-interference with 
the family laws by the colonial government, this appraisal contributed to the fear 
that what was not done by the colonial government was being attempted by the 
Pakistani government in an effort to implement the Commission’s 
recommendations. Therefore, the resistance of the JI was marked by a dual 
function of hope and fear: the hope of furthering its agenda of an Islamic state and 
the fear of interference in a protected sphere of Islamic law, i.e. the family laws. 
The JI’s uncompromising stance regarding the Commission’s recommendations 
and the MFLO cannot be viewed in isolation from these factors. 
Let us discuss some differences of opinion between the contending parties. 
One of the suggestions of the Commission was to increase the minimum age of 
marriage for the prevention of child marriages. The JI was not willing to allow 
any change in this regard through the legislative process (Islahi 1958, 110-121). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It was an effect of the enactment of the Evidence Act, 1872. 
9 The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. 
10 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.  
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Its official stance was that any legislative amendment in the minimum age of 
marriage would be against Islamic principles and the only way to address this 
issue was through education of the masses (Islahi 1958, 116). This strict stance of 
the JI appears to be different from Maududi’s previously expressed opinion 
regarding the regulation and control of child marriages. 
In his book Haquq uz Zojjain, written before the partition of the Indian 
Subcontinent, Maududi (1943, 117) once suggested that child marriages could be 
controlled and regulated. The issue he was dealing with then pertained to the non-
availability of the option of puberty11 for girls when their marriages were 
solemnized by their fathers or grandfathers. According to the classical or older 
law practiced in Indian Subcontinent before the promulgation of Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act 1939, there was no option of puberty for a girl whose 
marriage had been solemnized by her father or grandfather during her minority 
provided that the same was manifestly disadvantageous to the minor (Mulla 1995, 
409: Fyzee 2008, 73). Maududi was of the opinion that because of the widespread 
immorality among boys, if a girl was married by her father or grandfather without 
an option of puberty, she would be exposed to unaccountable hardship. Having 
this in mind, Maududi (1943, 117) suggested that child marriages should be 
controlled strictly so as to prevent girls from such sufferings. If that was not 
possible, then these girls should be provided the option of puberty regardless of 
the fact that their marriages were solemnized by their fathers or grandfathers. In 
this pre-partition debate, Maududi categorically displayed his preference for 
restricting child marriages as an option. But as far as the JI’s stance on the 
Commission’s recommendation for increasing the minimum age of marriage was 
concerned, that was without any such an option.   
The JI’s stance on the minimum age of marriage in response to the 
Commission’s recommendations was logically inconsistent. On the one hand, it 
demonstrated flagrant resistance to any legislative measure to control child 
marriages and on the other, it suggested that this problem should only be 
addressed by educating the people. The importance of education cannot be denied 
in dealing with social problems like this, but the JI ought to have been cognizant 
of the fact that legislative measures are also meant to have specific educational 
implications. Legal prohibitions are designed to generate and inculcate behavioral 
change. Thus, these are an inalienable part of the process of educating people.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Option of puberty is the right available to the minor to repudiate such a marriage on attaining 
majority which was solemnized during his/her minority by his/her guardian (Fyzee 2008, 73). 
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Let us go back to the process of the Commission’s investigation into the 
issues it charted out for analysis/recommendation. During this process, the 
Commission publicly circulated a questionnaire for broad-based consultation on 
selected issues. Maududi, in response to the questionnaire, agreed to the proposal 
for the registration of marriages but was of the opinion that it should be kept 
optional and not made compulsory (Maududi 1955, 02). In the same reply, 
Maududi (1955, 04-06) categorically stated that prohibition of child marriage and 
the introduction of similar rights of divorce for the wife in the marital contract 
would be against Islamic injunctions. After publication of the Commission’s 
report, the JI had acknowledged that there were issues which ought to have been 
addressed, e.g. issues of three consecutive divorces, polygamy and the inheritance 
rights of orphaned grandchildren from their grandparents (Islahi 1958, 212-220).12 
These issues were addressed by the Commission but the problem was that the JI 
was not satisfied with its recommendations.  
The JI’s public stance was very critical of the Commission’s 
recommendations. It was based on the perspective of futility that enacting any law 
on the basis of the Commission’s recommendations would not be effective in 
resolving unresolved issues and simply lead to more problems.13 For instance, 
presenting the JI’s version, Islahi (1958, 102-103) pointed out that the compulsory 
registration of marriage would resolve some existing issues of litigation regarding 
proof of marriage, but at the same time, the mechanism of registration would 
provide an opportunity to those who might fabricate registered documents without 
a real marriage and harass the victims in this way. Similarly, the proposed 
compulsory registration of marriage would also be troublesome for those who 
might have gone through the traditional process of marriage without getting it 
registered (Islahi 1958, 102-103). 
There is no doubt that every measure has its positive and negative aspects. 
For example, the proposed compulsory registration was going to affect those who 
had not been able to register their marriages under the law as pointed out by the 
JI. Similarly, keeping this aspect unattended as it was at that time was also bound 
to affect those who were or would be going through judicial proceedings for 
proving their marriages. Therefore, opting for one set of victims, either the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Maududi’s (1959, 29-44) article on the inheritance of the orphaned grandchildren may also be 
referred to this effect. 
13 Futility has been regarded as one of the three rhetoric of reaction by Hirschman (1991). 
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victims of the compulsory registration of marriage as per the JI or victims of the 
non-registration of marriage as visualized by the Commission, was not reflective 
reading of the divine but was instead influenced by the strained relationship of the 
parties. Both parties - the JI and the Commission - were of the opinion that their 
approach was more in line with the divine even though nothing has specifically 
been provided in the divine regarding the registration of marriage (Islahi 1958, 
99-101).  
Issues like this ought to be debated, while going beyond the realm of 
religious permissibility and impermissibility, as a legitimate law-making exercise 
by the state. As far as the divine is concerned, protecting the parties in a marriage 
is what the divine says, and registration is one of the modalities to realize this 
protection. But the fact of the matter is that both parties – the JI and the 
Commission - primarily got themselves involved in the religious uprightness of 
their respective stance which served to harden their positions rather than generate 
any space for mutual concession. As if both were bearers of the divine in their 
own way.  
In addition to the debate for and against the Commission’s 
recommendations and the MFLO, the political space of Pakistan was divided into 
the pro- and anti- camps of General Ayub, and the JI was situated in the latter 
camp. There were a few factors contributing to and strengthening the JI’s 
perspective regarding General Ayub’s Martial Law. General Ayub abrogated the 
Constitution of 1956 which had been declared “satisfactory and acceptable” by 
the consultative body of the JI (Muhammad 2001, 108). The JI’s stance regarding 
the abrogated Constitution of 1956 was informed by the insertion of Islamic 
provisions in the Constitution and the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic state 
(Nasr 1994, 143). 
The JI also won a significant number of seats in municipal elections held 
in Karachi in April 1958 before the imposition of Martial Law by General Ayub 
(Muhammad 2001, 120).14 This result was important due to the fact that Karachi 
was the capital of Pakistan at that time. It raised the hopes of the JI for a better 
performance in the national election scheduled to be held at the end of 1958 (Nasr 
1994, 145-146). However, due to the imposition of Ayub’s Martial Law, the 
scheduled national election did not take place. The Martial Law regime halted the 
electoral process and all political parties were banned including the JI. The 
expectation of having more political clout from a favourable result in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Out of its 23 candidates 19 won their seats. 
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scheduled national elections and the unexpected disappointment caused by 
Ayub’s Martial Law contributed to push the JI into the pro-democracy camp. 
The selection of issues by the Tarjumanul Quran and its manner of 
elaboration during that period was significant as there was consistent reference to 
democracy and democratic norms. This was because of the JI’s hope that if 
democracy was allowed to persist it would gain a significant share in the political 
space. This opinion was also emphasized by the JI in the very first meeting of its 
consultative body after the lifting of Martial Law in 1962 (Siddiqui 1962, 02-13). 
The JI then viewed the dictatorial system of General Ayub as a tool in the hands 
of the secularists to serve their interests. 
General Ayub relied continuously on the secular forces during his rule and 
also made efforts to lessen the influence of the JI (Nasr 1994, 150-155). For 
example, women belonging to APWA15 were at the forefront of the campaign for 
enactment of the MFLO and they were given opportunities to meet the President 
during his official tours within the country (Rehman 1997, 3). Conversely, this 
scenario was contributing to and hardening the resistance of the JI to the 
enactment of the MFLO, as the President’s patient hearing was only available to 
those who were in favor of its enactment. After the enactment of MFLO, the 
resistance of the JI did not subside and continuously demonstrated by rhetorical 
pronouncements. Thereafter, the government had to take strict measures to 
contain the resistance, including the imprisonment of some of the JI’s leaders and 
workers (Rahman 1997, 4-6: Muhammad 2000, 495). Thus, the relationship 
between the JI and General Ayub was characterized by antagonism and suspicion; 
this aspect was also part of the JI’s overall attitude towards the latter. In this 
loaded and hostile socio-political context, it is hard to assert that the JI’s opinion 
regarding the Commission’s recommendations and the enactment of MFLO was 
exclusively based on religious interpretations, as one could not understand the 
severity of its opinion and magnitude of its resistance without taking into 
consideration the political space of Pakistan at that time.  
3. The JI’s Support for Miss Fatima Jinnah as a Candidate for the 
President of Pakistan: 
In chronological sequence, this is the second example of how authenticity 
in the gender discourse of the JI has been constructed by the socio-political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 All Pakistan Women Association. Islahi (1950) articulated the JI’s perspective regarding APWA 
which displayed the pervasive distrust of the JI regarding the latter’s activities in general. This 
book was written by Islahi when he was one of the central leaders of the JI. 
Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies Vol. 5, No. 2 (2013) 
	   103	  
context. As far as the “standard” stance of the JI is concerned, it is of the opinion 
that women’s sphere of activity is different from that of men. Women are not only 
required, according to religious dictates, to do work inside their houses but are 
also naturally engineered for this job. Their participation in activities outside their 
homes is meant to cater for exceptional situations (Maududi 1943; 2010). It is 
pertinent to mention that in 1951, the JI represented by Maududi was one of those 
political parties and religious scholars who proposed that the head of an Islamic 
state should be a Muslim man (Muhammad 2001, 73). It was one of the 
unanimously articulated points out of 22 presented by the renowned religious 
scholars of that time (Muhammad 2001, 72-74). Keeping in view the “standard” 
stance of the JI, it is perplexing how it managed to support Miss Fatima Jinnah as 
the Presidential candidate of the country in 1965. 
This shift in stance can be fathomed if we analyze the relationship 
between the government of General Ayub and the JI. Some of the factors which 
shaped their mutual relationship characterized by antagonism and suspicion have 
been discussed in the previous section. Their strained relationship touched new 
heights of hostility during the period between the lifting of Martial Law in June 
1962 and the well-known Pakistan-India war of September 1965 (Muhammad 
2000; 2001), and formed the basis of the JI’s support of Fatima Jinnah for the 
Presidential candidate against General Ayub. Let us analyze these events. 
The JI was a forerunner in the campaign against the recommendations of 
the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws as elaborated in the preceding 
section. Its campaign was premised on the binary categorisation of religion and 
secularism. Supporters of implementation of the Commission’s recommendations 
were perceived to be the secular segments of society. Such a perception attained 
more currency after the enactment of the MFLO by General Ayub, hence it was 
sufficient proof to categorize him as a secularist. This perception was further 
strengthened by the extension of constitutional protection to the MFLO by the 
government (Rehman 1997, 46).  
The Constitution of 1962 originally did not provide for Fundamental 
Rights; these were incorporated later on. This incorporation exempted some laws 
from the application of Fundamental Rights and one of them was the MFLO. The 
reason for extending this sort of exemption to some laws including the MFLO 
was to protect them from judicial review on the touchstone of Fundamental 
Rights. Rehman (1997, 46), a leading jurist influenced by the ideology of the JI, 
opined that this protection “amounts to suspension of the Fundamental Right to 
profess, practise, and propagate one’s religion.” 
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In addition to the continuous rift between the government and the JI with 
respect to the MFLO, the Constitution of 1962, a brainchild of General Ayub, was 
different from the previous Constitution of 1956 in many respects. The JI was 
critical of some of those aspects, e.g. (1) the declaration of Pakistan as a republic 
instead of an Islamic republic, (2) the non- incorporation of the Fundamental 
Rights as provided in the Constitution of 1956, and (3) the inclusion of indirect 
elections instead of a universal adult franchise (Muhammad 2001, 146). The first 
meeting of the consultative body of the JI after the restoration of democracy and 
implementation of the Constitution of 1962 labeled the new Constitution as a 
dictatorial arrangement disguised under democracy (Muhammad 2001, 146). 
Due to significant differences between the two Constitutions – the one of 
1956 and the one of 1962 - many political parties, including the JI, raised a hue 
and cry. The government accepted some of the demands and introduced an 
amendment to the Constitution to incorporate Fundamental Rights and Pakistan 
was also declared to be an Islamic republic in January 1964. The acceptance of 
the demand for substituting the name as an Islamic republic has been termed by 
Joshi (2003, 65) as proof of “the potential of fundamentalist forces” in Pakistan. 
To be fair, there were certain other demands which had not been acceded to by the 
government. Therefore, acceding to some demands by the government did not 
merely demonstrate the political potential of the protesting groups including the 
JI; rather, it emphasized how far the government’s approach was utilitarian in its 
selection. For instance, the demand of the opposition parties including the JI for 
direct elections was not heeded by the government, as it was in conflict with its 
interest to rule the country without submitting itself to public accountability. 
In addition to the binary categorization of religion and secularism, there 
was another binary categorization running through the political space, i.e. 
democracy and dictatorship. Democracy was perceived to be aligned with religion 
and dictatorship was annexed to secularism (Siddiqui 1962, 02-13). The 
government of General Ayub was viewed as a dictatorship by the JI even after the 
lifting of Martial Law and implementation of the Constitution of 1962. The 
coupling of General Ayub with dictatorship was a persistent theme of the JI’s 
monthly journal Tarjumanul Quran. There was no substantial difference in this 
regard during the Martial Law period and after the implementation of the 
Constitution of 1962. 
The standard illustration of the above approach of the JI appeared in one 
of the editorial articles published by Tarjumanul Quran (Siddiqui 1963, 02-16) in 
which the author elaborated upon the specific psychological mindset of dictators, 
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relying on the examples of Alexander the Great and Hitler. This exercise was not 
meant to be just academic; it had definite political implications for its context and 
was carried out in order to make a connection with General Ayub. Thus, there was 
an ever-growing aversion to General Ayub, which was ultimately reflected in 
Maududi’s announcement that “even if Convention Muslim League [General 
Ayub’s party] nominated an angel [in future elections] the Jamaat would oppose 
him” (Nasr 1994, 154). 
Associating the government with dictatorship after the implementation of 
the Constitution of 1962 was supplemented by the self-portrayal of the JI as an 
unconditional supporter of democracy. The JI’s support for democracy was 
criticized by its opponents as an undue reliance on Western democratic norms 
(Siddiqui 1965b, 02). The JI’s stance was not without reason; the JI was hopeful 
that democracy would provide an opportunity to it to establish an Islamic state. 
The JI virtually romanticized democracy as the only available mode of human 
salvation in the political arena at that time, describing the evolution of 
constitutional means of change as a victory of humanity over anti-human forces 
(Siddiqui 1964, 10). 
The JI was also given a tough time by state authorities due to its untiring 
struggle against the government. The political activities of the JI were hampered 
on different pretexts. For example, the JI scheduled an annual meeting in October 
1963 but were not given permission to hold it at its scheduled venue, i.e. the 
famous Minto Park16; the JI had to shift to Bhatti Gate, which was not an 
appropriate place to organize such a gathering (Muhammad 2000, 504). 
Meanwhile, the government also enacted an Ordinance to prohibit the use of 
loudspeakers in public places. One of the purposes of such an enactment was to 
create hurdles in the smooth running of that scheduled meeting, according to the 
JI (Muhammad 2001, 154). Despite such preventive arrangements, the JI decided 
to hold its scheduled meeting. The meeting was attacked and even a few shots 
were fired as Maududi was addressing the opening session; one of the JI workers 
was killed during the incident (Nasr 1994, 154).  
The JI’s attitude against the government was also hardened by a series of 
events which took place at the beginning of 1964. The official permission to 
publish Tarjumanul Quran, the JI’s monthly journal, was withdrawn on 3rd 
January 1964. On 6th January 1964, the JI was proscribed. These events occurred 
just before the President’s assent to the first amendment of the Constitution on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Now Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore. 
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10th January 1964 (Muhammad 2000, 505), introducing Fundamental Rights into 
the Constitution of 1962. According to the JI (Muhammad 2001, 156), the 
President’s assent to the first constitutional amendment was deferred to avoid 
judicial scrutiny of discriminatory governmental measures taken against the JI so 
that the latter could not get any relief on the basis of Fundamental Rights through 
courts. The proscription of the JI was immediately followed by imprisonment of 
its entire consultative body including Maududi (Nasr 1994, 154).17 
The main leadership of the JI was still in prison when the Combined 
Opposition Parties decided to contest the forthcoming Presidential election in 
January 1965. The meeting of the Combined Opposition Parties to deliberate on 
the election was not attended by the frontline leadership of the JI, though some of 
its representatives were present in that meeting (Muhammad 2000, 510). After the 
deliberations, the opposition requested Fatima Jinnah to contest as a candidate for 
the President of Pakistan. Maududi was later contacted in prison and was 
“convinced...of the urgency of the situation and the necessity of giving Fatima 
Jinnah unwavering support” (Nasr 1994, 155). The proposal of the Combined 
Opposition Parties was accepted by the JI albeit with some hesitation and, 
thereafter, the latter jumped into the political arena with religious vigour to 
support Fatima Jinnah as a presidential candidate. The hesitation was expressed 
due to the fact that the JI had time and again asserted that an Islamic state should 
only be ruled by a Muslim male. After his release from prison, Maududi 
announced in a public meeting that there was no merit in General Ayub except 
that he is a man and there was no demerit in Fatima Jinnah except that she is a 
woman (Muhammad 2001, 162).  
The JI’s support of Fatima Jinnah led to a religiously-motivated debate as 
to whether a woman can become a head of an Islamic state or not. The irony of 
the situation was that General Ayub was supported by a significant segment of the 
traditional ulama; they were supporting him because he was a man whilst also 
producing a series of fatwas against the JI for its support of a woman (Nasr 1994, 
155). The response of the JI would have been straightforward and simple, had it 
proclaimed that it supported Fatima Jinnah for political reasons exclusively. But 
the JI’s perspective on Islam, that it encompasses all aspects of life, placed it at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 According to Nasr (1994, 155) forty-four members were arrested in that anti-JI move by the 
government. But as per the general secretary of the JI the total number of detainees was fifty-
four (Muhammad 2001, 156). 
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the centre of the controversy as to whether supporting a woman candidate was a 
religiously commendable act or not. 
Both sides of the debate had arguments to support their respective 
stances18 and were referring to similar religious texts and material for 
substantiating exactly opposite positions. One group was supporting a man as a 
candidate eligible for headship of an Islamic state and the so-called secularist 
General Ayub was the sole beneficiary of this stance. The other group was trying 
to portray the position that in exceptional circumstances, a woman could become 
leader of an Islamic state. 
Both these positions were basically the human understanding of religious 
evidence and how it might be applied to specific circumstances. Both groups were 
of the opinion that as per the general rule, a man should be a leader of an Islamic 
state and their basic difference pertained to whether the prevailing situation was 
sufficient to warrant resorting to the exception of supporting a woman for that 
post. Thus, the question which needed to be settled was whether existing 
circumstances on the political scene justified a departure from the norm. The JI 
was willing to regard them as such and attempted to justify its position while 
relying on various principles derived from Islam (Siddiqui 1965a, 02-16; 65-72). 
For example, it argued that any change in time, circumstances and intentions was 
likely to change a rule (Siddiqui 1965a, 06) and that the end justifies the means 
(Shehadeh 2003, 47). The JI’s approach was severely criticized by one of its ex-
comrades, Islahi19 (2000, 219-249). Islahi (2000) was of the opinion that “dire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The Conventional Muslim League (General Ayub’s party) published many pamphlets to show 
the inconsistencies and contradictions in the JI’s stance. For example, “Mohtarmaa Miss Fatima 
Jinnah aur Jamaat-i-Islami” and “Aurat aur Mansaba e Saddaarat.” The first had highlighted the 
contradictions between the JI’s standard stance on political participation of women and its 
support for Fatima Jinnah, while the second had compiled numerous fatwas from ulama across 
the country to demonstrate the irreligious nature of the JI’s support. The Combined Opposition 
Parties also reciprocated in the same manner. One of the most important pamphlets published by 
it had collected the opinions of ulama to substantiate its stance of supporting Fatima Jinnah 
(Kiya Aurat Muslamanoun ki Serbaraah ho sakati hai?).     
19 It is pertinent to mention that Islahi was one of the important leaders of the JI till he went his 
separate way in 1958. Islahi was of the view that the constitution of the JI confers dictatorial 
powers to its president/ameer (Muhammad 2000, 387). Islahi (2000, 53-78) has himself written 
about the series of events which culminated in his resignation from the JI. The rift between him 
and Maududi started when the latter pressured a central committee, constituted for a particular 
purpose by the consultative body of the JI, to resign from its task. Islahi was of the opinion that 
Maududi as president/ameer of the JI could not ask such a committee to resign which had been 
constituted by the JI’s consultative body.    
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circumstances” cannot justify conversion of any prohibited act into a permitted 
one. 
The JI then faced a perplexing situation: on the one hand, it was trying to 
demonstrate that its opinion had not been influenced by its strained relationship 
with the government, and on the other, it was asserting that the exigency of the 
situation had warranted treating the prevailing situation as exceptional (Siddiqui 
1965a, 03). This manner of argument by the JI was contradictory on the face of it. 
If we accept that the JI was not influenced by the prevailing circumstances in 
reading the divine, then we have to presuppose that it was situated outside the 
political context of that time. If the last presupposition is accurate, then how was 
it possible for the JI to evaluate the exceptional nature of the circumstances? 
Such a perplexing situation demonstrates the dilemma of the religiously-
oriented politics of the JI, as it had to demonstrate unequivocally, even to its own 
supporters, that its religious stance was not influenced by its political 
circumstances and motives. This objective was difficult to achieve without 
relativizing the human aspect of its reading of the divine and deemphasizing the 
peculiarity of its socio-political context. This is what the JI exactly did. The fact 
of the matter is that the JI experienced a tough time due to the various 
discriminatory measures of the government and these measures contributed in 
pushing the JI to support Fatima Jinnah. Were it not for the strained relationship 
between the JI and the government, there would have been negligible possibility 
of supporting Fatima Jinnah in the presidential election. So the prevailing socio-
political context constituted as a significant component in shaping the authenticity 
of the JI’s stance regarding the headship of an Islamic state by a woman.  
 
4. Hudood Ordinances, 1979 (HOs): 
This section looks at the political scenario and context of Pakistan a 
decade later in order to appreciate the JI’s stance on the HOs. The JI’s stance in 
this regard cannot be properly understood without an appraisal of the prevailing 
circumstances and goodwill between the JI and Zia-ul-Haq’s government. This 
analysis underscores the significance of that particular context in shaping the 
authenticity of the JI regarding the HOs.  
Pakistan was engulfed in a political crisis after the national elections of 
1977. As a consequence, the then Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq 
imposed Martial Law on the country. General Zia was known for his religious 
devoutness before his usurpation of power, and his personal inclinations had 
influenced his way of governing the country (Nawaz 2008, 359). Political 
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developments in the country at that time also provided every opportunity for 
employing the slogans of Islam. These developments were partly contributed to 
by the Nizam-e-Mustafa (system of the Prophet Muhammad) campaign of the 
Combined Opposition Parties against the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. 
These parties contested the national elections of 1977 under the alliance known as 
the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The elections were won by Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Thereafter, the alliance leveled 
allegations of massive vote rigging against the incumbent Prime Minister Bhutto 
and launched a protest campaign (Rizvi 1988; Nawaz 2008). This campaign was 
later on transformed into a demand for the enforcement of Nizam-e-Mustafa in the 
country (Rizvi 1988, 233).  
Thus, in addition to Zia’s personal religious inclinations, a religiously-
motivated political campaign laid down the framework and strategy of how to 
prolong his stay in power. The international community was not very critical of 
the rise in religious fervor of the country as such heightened religiosity was 
necessary for containing the imminent threat of the USSR in the region (Nawaz 
2008). 
The JI was one of the component political parties of the PNA and also 
significantly instrumental in bringing the campaign of Nizam-e-Mustafa to a 
climax. After the imposition of Martial Law, the JI had to make a choice between 
the pro-democracy alliance led by the PPP and Zia’s regime. The list of 
grievances held by the JI against the PPP’s previous government was enough to 
keep it from standing hand in hand with the pro-democracy alliance. The then 
president/ameer of the JI Main Tufail Muhammad was arrested and put behind the 
bars (Muhammad 2001, 259). One of its prominent leaders, Dr Nazir,20 was 
murdered during that period (Muhammad 2001, 265). There were numerous other 
incidents reported by the JI of maltreatment, imprisonment and killing of its 
workers and of throwing hand grenades at its public meetings (Muhammad 2001, 
259; 265-267). Even families of the JI’s leaders were not spared. For instance, 
Mian Tufail Muhammad’s (ameer/president of the JI) wife and son were arrested 
and put behind the bars by the PPP’s regime (Muhammad 2001, 267). Bhutto’s 
regime tried to shut down the JI’s newspaper Jasarat and arrested its editor Syed 
Salahuddin and mistreated him during his imprisonment (Muhammad 2001, 240; 
251). According to the JI, these incidents could not have been successfully staged 
without the involvement of the PPP’s government (Muhammad 2000; 2001). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Member of the Parliament. 
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JI termed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s regime as a “black period” in Pakistan’s political 
history and specifically condemned the latter’s discriminatory attitude against the 
former (Siddiqui 1978b, 03-05). Therefore, the JI’s option was simple and made 
easier by regular pronouncements of General Zia to initiate a comprehensive 
policy of Islamization in the country. 
The democratic rhetoric, an essence of the JI and its journal Tarjumanul 
Quran during its struggle against General Ayub, was noticeably invisible during 
Zia’s Martial Law. Nasr (1994, 189) states that this change of heart in the JI’s 
stance created disharmony between the JI’s ideological position of Islamizing the 
country and its political aims which were hitherto dependent on the continuity of 
the democratic process. This shift was negotiated by the JI through prioritizing its 
ideological position and political aims. The ideological position was an end and 
the political aims of achieving it through democracy were a means to that end. 
But if the end was likely to be achieved through other means, i.e. Martial Law, 
then there was no harm in opting for that. The contradiction inherent in this shift 
was blurred by highlighting the dictatorial way in which the democracy was run 
during the Bhutto-led PPP government (Siddiqui 1978f, 06). 
General Ayub’s Martial Law and its initiatives were viewed by the JI as 
suspicious and supportive of secular segments of the country. In this new scenario 
under the Islamized leadership of General Zia, the selection of words and phrases 
had undergone an enormous transformation particularly during the initial few 
years of Zia’s government. There was widespread optimism and jubilation within 
the JI regarding Zia’s initiatives to Islamize the country and insistence on the 
bone fide intentions of Zia’s government in this regard (Siddiqui 1978a, 02-08; 
1978c, 02-08). In an editorial of Tarjumanul Quran, the Martial Law team, 
including its civilian component, was regarded as the first team ever in Pakistan’s 
history with bona fide intentions and the requisite qualifications to implement 
Islamic law (Siddiqui 1978f, 02). In the same editorial, the JI’s stance regarding 
Martial Law was justified as it was more important to implement Islamic laws 
rather than fruitlessly support democratic government in the country.21 It was 
pointed out in some editorials of Tarjumanul Quran how coercive force was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 There were scores of other editorials/articles/interviews suggesting how to Islamize different 
social and institutional aspects of the country. For example, how to revive Islamic system 
pertaining to salat, zakat, oath, expenditures and Ramadan (Siddiqui 1978d, 02), how to 
Islamize the education system (Siddiqui 1978g, 02), and how to bring Islamic reforms to the 
taxation system (Maududi 1979, 10-12). 
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important for bringing about any change in society (Siddiqui 1978c, 05-06; 
1978e, 05-06). Such debates reflected the relevance of the socio-political context 
in which the JI was constrained to make concessions to a military government, 
especially in the face of the expected coercive measures of Zia’s Martial Law. 
This was also meant to prepare the minds of its supporters for such measures.  
This attitudinal change represents a consistent thread of the JI’s 
romanticism regarding state-oriented institutions to transform a country. In 
General Ayub’s Martial Law, these institutions were viewed as tools in the hands 
of secular segments and therefore worthy of condemnation, but in General Zia’s 
regime these institutions were supportive of the Islamic agenda and hence 
appreciated and viewed positively.  
For instance, in General Ayub’s period the constitutional protection of the 
MFLO from judicial review on the touchstone of Fundamental Rights was 
conclusive proof of the secular tendencies of the government. The same kind of 
protection of the MFLO from judicial review on the basis of the touchstone of 
Islam from the newly-constituted Shariat Benches was “astonishing” but did not 
constitute sufficient proof to shake the JI’s belief in Zia’s bona fide intentions 
(Siddiqui 1979a, 07). The protection extended to the MFLO by Zia’s government 
from the Shariat Benches was a more serious issue as compared to General 
Ayub’s constitutional protection, due to the fact that the former government was 
making big claims for the Islamization of the country, and the sole purpose of 
establishing the Shariat Benches was to ensure all laws should conform to Islamic 
dictates through the judicial process. Thus, it ought to have been severely 
criticized as to why the MFLO was extended protection from this scrutiny despite 
claims of thorough Islamization, but the JI did not do that. 
Given this background, the JI’s unconditional support of the HOs ought to 
be viewed as a continuous reflection of its excessively positive attitude towards 
Zia’s Martial Law (Siddiqui 1979b, 02). The JI’s approach to Islamic criminal law 
and particularly hudood punishments has been explicitly spelled out by Maududi 
in his writings (Maududi 2001, 320-329; 1962, 54-59). According to his 
approach, the implementation of hudood punishments without properly preparing 
a society for that purpose would amount to zulm or injustice. 
Maududi (2001, 320-321) has observed that without massive social 
reforms, we cannot resort to implementation of hudood punishments. For 
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example, before resorting to hadd of zina,22 a society should establish separate 
social spheres for men and women. It should also discourage other factors which 
may have an encouraging effect on the commission of zina. It ought to have a 
standard system of marriage and divorce as per Islamic dictates. On the other 
hand, if the commission of zina is made easier and all sorts of encouragement for 
its commission are widespread in a society, then there is no justification for 
resorting to hudood punishments (Maududi 2001, 320-321). 
Maududi (2001, 321-322) has contended that if hadd of theft is intended to 
be introduced without eliminating those factors which tempt someone to commit 
it or without having established an Islamic system of financial regulation, then its 
implementation would not be justified. According to him, the Islamic system of 
financial regulation is characterized by implementation of zakat, elimination of 
interest, and the fair distribution of wealth. Moreover, there ought not to be an 
excessive imposition of taxes and the necessities of life should not be beyond the 
reach of common people due to exorbitant prices (Maududi 2001, 321-322).  
Maududi (1962, 59) has also distinguished between two situations which 
ought to be kept in view regarding any debate on hudood laws: the first where a 
hudood-based system is working, and the second where it is planned to be 
introduced. He (1962, 59) opines that the latter situation requires a more prudent 
approach. It implies that the delay in the introduction of a hudood-based system is 
affordable in the latter situation, and in the meantime, efforts should be made for 
the prevention of socially encouraging factors for the commission of hudood 
offences, rather than introducing the system of hudood first and then trying to 
focus on such social factors. 
Having read the above elaboration of Maududi, if one analyzes the JI’s 
stance on the HOs of General Zia (Siddiqui 1979b, 02), one is bound to be 
surprised as there is a wide gap between the theory and the practice. The JI 
extended its unconditional support to the HOs (Siddiqui 1979b, 02) without 
considering the prerequisites as laid down by Maududi. A question ought to have 
been raised from within the JI as to whether society was brought to the level 
specified by Maududi where such punishments could be enforced. If the 
prerequisites were not met, then what sort of necessity was there to 
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   Hadd	   literally	   means	   limitation	   but	   in	   Islamic	   Criminal	   Law	   it	   is	   employed	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  
maximum	  penalty	  prescribed	   for	  some	  offences	   in	   the	  Quran	  and	  Sunnah.	  Hadd	  of	  zina	  means	  
maximum	  penalty	  for	  illicit	  sexual	  intercourse.	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unconditionally support the HOs? This situation illustrates how the political 
exigencies of the period drove the JI to rearticulate its authentic version regarding 
hudood. 
The gap between the “standard” stance and its practical manifestation was 
attributable to many factors. One of them, i.e. goodwill between the JI and Zia’s 
government, has already been referred to earlier in this section. No doubt one 
cannot understate the part played by the JI in deviating from its own “standard” 
approach, but at the same time it needs to be emphasized that it was facilitated by 
a particular context. At the time of the Zia’s coup, the JI was a part of the 
opposition alliance (PNA) and this alliance joined Zia’s government (Muhammad 
2000, 357). On the one hand, the JI was aiming to “share the credit” of the 
government’s policy of Islamization (Rizvi 1988, 236). On the other, it was 
apparently tired of its overwhelming oppositional politics during General Ayub 
and Prime Minister Bhutto’s regimes (Nasr 1994) and might be expecting to have 
some respite during Zia’s so-called Islamic Martial Law. 
Zia’s government was actually steered by the army and the civilian 
component was often bypassed by the military on significant policy decisions 
(Rizvi 1988, 236). General Zia was apparently very focused on his objective of 
how to prolong his stay in power. He capitalized on the religious sensibilities of 
the people and in this manner, expanded the power and capacity of the state and 
his government (Nasr 2001). On the eve of the coup, his government initially 
promised to hold free and fair elections, but then it started to shift its emphasis to 
Islamization and accountability in search of legitimacy (Rizvi 1988: Nawaz 
2008). To this end, the government was playing its cards very shrewdly. For 
instance, the HOs were promulgated on the same day as Muslims were 
celebrating the Prophet’s birthday. This religiously-charged atmosphere made it 
unlikely for the JI to apply a critical gaze on the HOs on the touchstone of Islam. 
The JI cannot be exonerated from its part in heightening religious 
sentiment to this level as its role was pivotal in the campaign of Nizam-e-Mustafa. 
Thereafter, the JI itself became a victim of this heightened religious atmosphere 
which masked the shift that took place in its own stance. Neither did the JI 
observe the loopholes in the HOs, nor did the former think the latter worthy of 
being critically scrutinized as in the case of the MFLO. In the case of the MFLO, 
the stained relationship between the government and the JI facilitated the latter to 
critically go through the law and point out its loopholes. But as far as the HOs 
were concerned, the scenario was dominated by goodwill. Therefore, the JI 
restricted its role to advising the government in order to keep an eye on the 
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implementation of the HOs so that their implementation would not be hampered 
by the secular segments of the country (Siddiqui 1979b, 04-05). 
In its quest for Islamization, the JI basically sidelined those factors which 
Maududi underlined as necessary preconditions for initiating a hudood-based 
system. The authenticity of the JI regarding the HOs was partly due to its location 
in a religiously-heightened atmosphere and partly because of its excessively 
positive attitude towards General Zia’s policy of Islamization. Thus, the political 
context of the country contributed to shape its authenticity and there seems little 
reason to equate its stance on the HO’s with comprehensive representation of the 
divine.23 
5. Protection of Women Act, 2006 (PWA): 
           The process leading to the enactment of the PWA during Musharraf’s 
regime (1999-2008) represents an important episode regarding the confrontation 
over women’s rights in Pakistan by different political parties. This law was meant 
to address the loopholes of Zia’s HOs, amending some of its provisions. Although 
the enactment of this law did not fulfil the demand of the human rights activists of 
totally repealing the HOs, it was a significant step towards minimizing some of 
the hardships experienced by women victims (Lau 2007, 1307; 1313).  
           The PWA has repealed the hadd penalty for rape and exclusively brought it 
within the domain of tazir24 offences. It has also reduced the penalty for a 
voluntary sexual relationship. Moreover, a strict procedure has been introduced 
for the initiation of any proceedings which might lead to infliction of the hadd 
penalty.  
For our analysis, this section forms the other half of the same debate 
undertaken in the preceding section. In that section, it has been elaborated how 
the JI deviated from its previously held authenticity regarding the enforcement of 
hudood laws and extended its unconditional support of the HOs due to the 
specificity of the socio-political context. This section analyzes how the socio-
political context of the PWA made it difficult for the JI to review its stance on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 There are many scholars who have critiqued the HOs or punishments provided there from an 
Islamic perspective, e.g. Quraishi (2003), Farooq (2006), Cheema and Mustafa (2008-2009), 
Ghamidi (2009, 35-136). That is why it would not be a straightforward inference to say that the 
HOs in its original form were a mirror representation of Islamic dictates on hudood laws.  
24	  Tazir is a right of a state to criminalize any act and to prescribe its punishment. Tazir is different 
from Hadd whose punishment is provided by Shariah itself. 
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HOs. In other words, it highlights the circumstances which contributed to harden 
the JI’s stance in favour of the HOs and against the PWA. 
Given the fact that the JI’s support of the HOs does not reflect its 
“standard” opinion as explained in the previous section, one would have expected 
the JI not to go too far in its efforts to protect the HOs. But the JI branded the 
efforts of Musharraf’s government for enacting the PWA as a “war against 
Hudood Allah” (Ahmad 2006). The religious segment of the country including 
the JI was apprehensive that the enactment of the PWA would lay down the 
foundations of a free-sex society and the westernization of the country (Lau 2007; 
Ghauri 2006). Bearing in mind the strict stance of the JI against the PMA, let us 
analyze the role of socio-political context for constructing the JI’s authentic 
version. 
When the Pakistani Army dislodged the civilian government of Nawaz 
Sharif on 12th October 1999 under the leadership of General Musharraf, the JI 
was not very sceptical of the coup. The consultative body of the JI appreciated the 
coup and demanded that an interim government ought to be put in place for the 
purpose of carrying out a process of thorough accountability (Ahmad 1999, 03-
05). The coup was also generally welcomed by the public (Malik 2001, 357). The 
editor of Tarjumanul Quran regarded the public jubilance on the coup as a 
“public referendum” (Ahmad 1999, 05). 
General Musharraf’s coup was a counter-coup designed to prevent 
excessive interference in the military by Nawaz’s government, and it was not 
planned in the same way as previous military coups in Pakistan (Malik 2001, 
358). After General Musharraf’s takeover in October 1999, the Martial Law 
regime was hard-pressed to find a way to provide legitimacy to its 
unconstitutional assumption of power as the international response to the coup 
was not favorable, particularly from the democratic West (Malik 2001, 358; 
Butler 1999). For instance, the Commonwealth suspended Pakistan’s membership 
from all its organizations and also debarred it from attending the forthcoming 
summit in South Africa (Black 1999: Deans 1999). 
Keeping in view such an unfavorable response, Musharraf thought it 
appropriate to portray his soft image of an enlightened moderate as a strategy to 
fill the legitimacy void. The first instance of this kind was his appearance before 
foreign journalists with his two Pekinese dogs (Burke 1999). The Independent’s 
London reporters regarded it as “another offensive [by Musharraf] to win over 
international opinion” (Bennett-Jones, O. and Peter Popham 1999). In another 
effort of the same kind, General Musharraf proclaimed in an interview with The 
Guardian that Attaturk Mustafa Kamal Pasha was his ideal (Burke 1999). Such 
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efforts of General Musharraf might have had a softening impact regarding his 
image in the West, but these efforts laid down the basis of a suspicious 
relationship between General Musharraf and the religious parties, including the JI. 
These incidents started to dispel whatever goodwill there was between the JI and 
General Musharraf.  
In this scenario, the Tarjumanul Quran republished Maududi’s critical 
review of a book written on Attaturk six decades ago (Maududi 2000, 51-55). The 
review presented the standard version of the JI regarding Attaturk. In the review, 
Maududi condemned Attaturk’s efforts to secularize Turkey by abolishing Islamic 
law and introducing Western legal codes. Maududi also rebuked him for banning 
the purdah and encouraging a Western style of liberty for women. Without 
leaving anything for speculation, the editor of the Tarjumanul Quran specifically 
attributed the re-publication of the review to General Musharraf’s idealization of 
Attaturk (Maududi 2000, 51). So, the stage was once again set for a similar 
relationship to that of General Ayub and the JI, with the substitution of General 
Ayub by General Musharraf as far as the secular segment of the society was 
concerned, while the JI had been consistently occupying the pro-Islam camp. 
Thus, the brief period of unspoken concessions between General 
Musharraf and the JI was soon overtaken by seeds of suspicion. This uneasy 
relationship was aggravated after the disaster of 9/11, when General Musharraf 
unreservedly supported the notorious war on terror while the JI unequivocally 
criticized it. This new situation started to categorize people into pro- and anti-war 
camps in Pakistan. Given this new categorization, those who were situated in the 
other camp were liable to be viewed as suspicious because of their support of the 
enemy. The JI and General Musharraf were in opposing camps and their 
respective positions made it difficult to accommodate each other. This divide was 
so decisive and categorical that it did not only influence their war-related 
perspectives; it started to penetrate every aspect of their mutual relationship. The 
editorials and articles published in Tarjumanul Quran during this period were 
consistently broadening the scope of the war on terror to connect it to other issues, 
e.g. identity politics, the nuclear assets of Pakistan (e.g. Ahmed 2004), and the 
educational system of the country. The frequency of such writings had been 
definitely on the rise ever since 9/11.  
Let us briefly go through some of the editorials and articles dealing with 
religious education published during the period of the war on terror and the 
enactment of the PWA. These writings demonstrate how far the war on terror was 
instrumental in shaping the response of the JI. In one of the editorials of 
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Tarjumanul Quran, captioned “Weapon of Mass Destruction of New Crusade: 
Assault on the Education System”, Ahmad (2004a) elaborated upon how 
education was brought into focus when the map of the war was drawn after 9/11. 
As per the author’s point of view, one of the main objectives of such a remapping 
of the war was to destroy the religious education of Muslims. Ahmad (2004a) 
stated that the educational system was a main source of the ideological training of 
Muslims, purifying their individual character and sensitizing them to the unity of 
ummah. But these characteristics are regarded by the present American leadership 
as a major stumbling block in the realization of its interests (Ahmad 2004a). The 
JI’s then ameer/president, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, equated any effort for bringing 
change to the education system as part of America’s imperially assertive right of 
pre-emptive attack (Ahmed 2005). The employment of terminologies such as 
‘weapons of mass destruction’ and ‘pre-emptive strikes’ with respect to the 
education system by leaders of the JI exposes the infiltration of the war on terror 
into a sphere which is beyond actual warfare.25  
Efforts meant to reorient the education system were facilitated by General 
Musharraf through the legal and institutional mechanisms of the country as per 
the JI (Khalid 2004b).26 This line of reasoning can also be viewed in Ahmed’s 
(2004) editorial article where General Musharraf was criticized for his measures 
to implement the educational, cultural and civilizational agenda of the West. 
Thus, according to the JI, the sympathies of Musharraf were becoming clearer in 
that his agenda was driven not by a genuine need, but rather by the interests of 
Western powers.  
The above manner of argumentation channelled through Western cultural 
and civilizational agenda can be traced in Ahmad’s (2006) editorial of the 
Tarjumanul Quran which equated any interference with the HOs as waging war 
against hudood Allah. Ahmad (2006, 03-06) highlights the similarities between 
Bush’s sponsored war on Iraq and Musharraf’s war against hudood Allah while 
making the point that there is a difference between the declared objectives and 
real targets of the two. The declared objective of enacting the PMA is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  One may observe similar kinds of analysis to strengthen the fear that America was determined 
to reorient the education system to serve its own purposes under the garb of promoting peace 
(Khalid 2004a).  
26 Khalid (2004b) analyzed the attitude of the government regarding Agha Khan Board to 
substantiate how Musharraf’s government facilitated the efforts to change the education 
system of the country. 
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protection of women’s rights but its real target is the secularization of the society 
and depriving the country of its Islamic identity (Ahmad 2006, 04). 
This politics of suspicion and fear between General Musharraf and the JI 
was also deepened by another well-entrenched ideological difference that 
pertained to their views on Islam. General Musharraf portrayed Islam as an 
enlightened moderate religion. On the other hand, such a portrayal was regarded 
by the JI as another dimension of Western, and particularly America’s, new 
imperial agenda. Ahmad (2004b), in his editorial article captioned “Enlightened 
Moderation or New American Deen-e-Illahi”, described the standard version of 
the JI in this regard. The employment of the phrase Deen-e-Illahi is significant per 
se. It refers to the Great Mughal Emperor Akbar’s construction of a religion 
known as Deen-e-Illahi, developed by mixing elements from religions other than 
Islam. From this perspective, the emphasis on an enlightened moderate Islam by 
General Musharraf was another episode reminiscent of similar efforts carried out 
by Akbar earlier. Musharraf’s efforts, in this regard, are part of a broader project 
of introducing a new world order and paving the way for the imposition of an 
American value system in all spheres of life (Ahmad 2004b). 
The JI’s view of dominance of the Western value system contributed in 
shaping its opinion regarding the unequivocal protection it extended to the HOs. 
Having this perspective in mind, the then ameer/president of the JI warned the 
government that there must not be any interference with hudood and the 
blasphemy laws (Ahmed 2004, 04). 
This was the socio-political context wherein General Musharraf was 
making efforts to enact the PWA and the JI was trying its best to resist its 
enactment. It is submitted that this context contributed to hardening the JI’s 
position on the divinity of the HOs, to the extent that it refused to participate in a 
parliamentary committee to discuss the draft of the PWA (Lau 2007, 1306). 
Ultimately, this scenario led to its rhetorical declaration that the legislation of the 
PWA was equivalent to waging war against “Hudood Allah” (Ahmad 2006).  
It has been elaborated in the preceding section that the JI rearticulated its 
authenticity regarding the HOs while influenced by the prevailing goodwill 
context during Zia’s Martial Law. In case of the PWA, it was the context of 
pervasive suspicion and distrust between the JI and General Musharraf which 
facilitated the JI to bluntly criticize any effort to amend the HOs and enact the 
PWA, despite the fact that the former was not consistent with its standard stance 
regarding hudood laws. So in one way or another, the socio-political context was 
important in shaping the authenticity of the JI. 
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6. Election of Women Members of the JI to Reserved Seats of 
Parliament: 
This is the final example of the construction of authenticity in the JI’s 
gender discourse under the influence of the socio-political context in the present 
paper.  
On 21 August 2002, General Musharraf introduced a Legal Framework 
Order (LFO) which brought some changes to the Constitution of 1973 (Mirza 
2009, 2). The LFO restored a joint electorate in the country and increased the total 
number of seats in all assemblies, including the upper house of Parliament, i.e. the 
Senate. It also provided for a representation of 17% women on reserved seats in 
both houses of Parliament and provincial assemblies (Mirza 2009, 2). One of the 
objectives of the LFO’s promulgation was to condone all previous actions of 
General Musharraf. Another was to conduct national elections under this new 
arrangement, scheduled to be held in 2002. 
This legal arrangement left the parties with a choice: to opt for contesting 
the elections under the LFO, or not to contest at all. General Musharraf had 
already got himself elected through a controversial referendum held in April, 
2002 (Mirza 2009, 1). It was certain at that time that General Musharraf would 
remain as President for the next five years. In such a situation, opting out of the 
elections would amount to a political demise. Even those political parties such as 
the Pakistan People’s Party and the Muslim League (Nawaz) which were 
victimized by General Musharraf during the initial years of his rule decided not to 
leave the political space open for the President and his allies. 
The issue for religious parties including the JI was not about a political 
demise only. Rather, these parties were hoping to make some electoral gains due 
to the involuntary exile of the leadership of two main political parties of the 
country, i.e. Pakistan People’s Party and the Muslim League (Nawaz). To fill this 
political gap, six religious parties including the JI constituted an alliance as 
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).  
The MMA’s expectancy of making political gain was also strengthened by 
events taking place in the region after 9/11. After 9/11, America and NATO 
commissioned their forces in Afghanistan. The MMA was the most vocal political 
alliance to condemn the presence of foreign forces in the region. Historically an 
alliance of religious parties, the MMA managed to have reasonable public support 
in areas situated near the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The presence of 
foreign forces in Afghanistan provided another opportunity for the MMA to stir 
up and capitalize on anti-American sentiments. The MMA played its cards well 
and gained historic results by winning 18% of the seats in Parliament (Nawaz 
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2008, 532). These seats were mostly won from the above-mentioned areas, i.e. the 
provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously known as NWFP), and 
Balochistan.  
After the elections, the religious alliance including the JI had to choose 
from going for election to the reserved seats of women as provided by the LFO, or 
to simply leave the space for other contenders. Politically, the situation was not 
very complex but due to the pronounced stance of the religious parties on the 
political participation of women, it was made difficult. For instance, it was 
explicitly disapproved by Maududi (n/d, 100) for women to sit in mixed 
parliaments and councils.  
For the JI, the issue was not new. Previously in Zia’s hand-picked 
Parliament, one of its women members was nominated and served as a member of 
the Parliament. So, the psychological barrier of contradicting its “standard” 
position had already been crossed by the JI during Zia’s period. But, thereafter, it 
did not nominate any woman to contest the reserved seats in any house of 
Parliament and that sole nomination was part of a fading memory. So, it was 
General Musharraf’s initiative of introducing a substantial number of reserved 
seats for women which brought this issue to the forefront again.    
The JI, along with its alliance of religio-political parties, opted for a more 
politically pragmatic approach to contest the reserved seats so that it would not 
lose any opportunity to have more seats in the Parliament. As far as the political 
implications of this decision were concerned there was no viable objection to it, 
since it was every political party’s legitimate right to desire and strategize to gain 
the maximum number of seats in legislative assemblies. What is important to 
highlight here is how politics shapes a particular understanding of religion. As per 
the “standard” discourse of the JI, there ought to be different spheres for men and 
women, but due to non-realization of this ideal, religion did not prevent the JI 
taking a different route, irrespective of the fact that it was likely to expose women 
to mixed gatherings and violation of a number of other forms of purdah, including 
purdah of eyes and listening to strangers. 
This scenario demonstrates the predicament of a complex relationship 
between religion and political goals. How is religion to be employed for political 
goals or how is politics to be pursued for religious ends? Contesting elections and 
gaining maximum seats in assemblies is politically understandable despite the fact 
that these seats come through reorienting previously pronounced authenticity. But 
whenever one tries to justify such contradictions in religious terms, one has to 
employ dichotomies of means and end on the one hand, and on the other, general 
Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies Vol. 5, No. 2 (2013) 
	   121	  
rule and exceptional circumstances (Maalik 2005, 61-62). For instance, 
establishing an Islamic state/system is an end and to gain maximum seats is a 
means to that end according to the JI. As a general rule, women are allocated a 
different sphere from men according to the JI, but if it is difficult to realize the 
general rule then for the time being, exceptional circumstances/necessity grants 
women permission to become a part of mixed sphere of activity. 
Thus, the opinion of the JI regarding the participation of women in 
political space is not substantiated by its reading of the divine, as its reading of the 
divine emphatically divides spheres between men and women. Rather, it is a 
product of that specific context anchored by General Musharraf’s policy of 
enhancing the number of reserved seats for women in the Parliament which 
softened its stance on women’s participation in mixed parliament and councils. 
Thereafter, the JI attempted to substantiate its authenticity in religious terms by 
prioritizing political ends over means and reinforcing it by logic of necessity. Had 
the opportunity of enhanced seats for women not been provided by the socio-
political context, the JI would not be in a position to rearticulate its authenticity 
afresh in this regard.  
7. Conclusion: 
The paper has explored the relevance of the socio-political context in the 
construction of authenticity in the JI’s gender discourse. While doing so it has 
problematized the assumption that authenticity is exclusively shaped by the divine 
rather it is influenced considerably by many factors and one of them is socio-
political context. This is so because readings of the divine cannot be carried out in 
a vacuum; these are always done in different contexts. These contexts infiltrate 
into our readings in many ways. For instance, specificity of a particular context 
may make us realize that it ought to be regarded as exceptional. This was one of 
the main arguments of the JI when it supported Fatima Jinnah as a presidential 
candidate of the country. Sometimes the context may facilitate how to prioritize 
between means and ends. It was this mental confrontation which lured the JI to 
support the Islamization of General Zia and nominate its women members to 
contest the reserved seats for women in the Parliament during General 
Musharraf’s regime. Therefore, the lesson of the paper is that before equating the 
human interpretations with the divine, we need to question ourselves inquisitively 
as well as persistently so as to ascertain how far these interpretations are 
influenced by the specificity of their socio-political contexts. 
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